- From
- Alice Johnson <alice.johnson@acme-corp.com>
- To
- soc@acme-corp.com
- Date
- 2026-04-19 09:42 UTC
Employee reported a suspicious 'CEO' email and entered credentials
Attempt 1 of 1 · cmqd4z0ea00020j4o7pbykofd
This is your first attempt for this scenario. Retry the scenario to generate a side-by-side comparison against your previous response.
Stay on Easy · Cybersecurity
3 signals are blocking advancement to Medium. Keep practicing at Easy until those areas stabilize. (Track: Cybersecurity)
Signals helping
- Dangerous action frequency. None in recent attempts
- Rubric category coverage. 67% average (need ≥ 55%)
Signals blocking advancement
- Recent average score. 65 / 100 (need ≥ 75)
- Recent pass rate. 1 of 5 passed (need ≥ 66%)
- Recent retry improvement trend. Score is regressing (-11.5 pts on later attempts)
# Web Proxy (src=10.12.40.88 alice-wks) 09:21:04 GET https://acme-corp-login[.]net/auth?u=alice 200 (TLS, cert: Let's Encrypt, age 3d) 09:21:39 POST https://acme-corp-login[.]net/auth/submit 302 09:21:40 GET https://office.com/ 200 # Entra ID sign-in logs (user: alice.johnson@acme-corp.com) 09:22:11 SUCCESS IP 185.244.25.17 (Netherlands, hosting) UA: "python-requests/2.31" MFA: Not challenged (session token replay) 09:22:47 SUCCESS IP 185.244.25.17 App: Outlook Web Action: New-InboxRule "archive-all"
- Name
- alice.johnson@acme-corp.com
- Type
- Finance user account + workstation (alice-wks)
- Owner
- Finance Dept · Alice Johnson
- Level
- High
Hi Alice, Thanks for reporting the incident to us. From now on, do NOT click the link, or enter the credentials again. We will be investigating the incident immediately, and please keep the PC powered on, but do not use Microsoft 365 or email. Additionally, please disconnect WiFi/Cellular Data/Hotspot on your PC and wait until the SOC team reaches you out. The SOC Team will reset your password, revoke active sessions, review suspicious inbox rules, and check whether any emails or files were accessed or sent from your account.
The response is missing several critical incident response steps. Review the rubric and try again. Score: 26/100. Strongest area: Asset impact (67%). Weakest area: Attack understanding (0%) — expand this next time.
Where points came from
- Attack understanding0/3 · 0.0 / 15
- Asset impact2/3 · 6.7 / 10
- Prioritization1/2 · 5.0 / 10
- 1/5 · 4.0 / 20
- Investigation1/4 · 3.8 / 15
- Recovery0/3 · 0.0 / 10
- Evidence preservation0/3 · 0.0 / 10
- Clarity & structure1/2 · 6.5 / 10
Strengths
No category reached 70% coverage.
Missing / weak
- Attack understanding
- Investigation
- Recovery
- Evidence preservation
Dangerous actions detected
None detected in your response.
Learn from this attempt
Post-submission coaching for this scenario. Score and verdict are unchanged — these notes are for your next attempt.
Why points were deducted
- Attack understanding0% coverage
Name this as adversary-in-the-middle / session-token replay (the 09:22 sign-in had no challenge), not just `phishing for a password`.
- Recovery0% coverage
Re-enable with phishing-resistant / Conditional Access and a targeted awareness refresher, not just `tell Alice to be careful`.
- Evidence preservation0% coverage
Preserve the original phishing email (.eml, full headers), export sign-in / proxy / mailbox , and capture the inbox rule before disabling it.
Model answer outline
Alice (Finance) was lured by a fake CEO request, entered her credentials on acme-corp-login[.]net, and within a minute her session was replayed from 185.244.25.17 (Netherlands hosting, `python-requests/2.31`) without an MFA challenge. The attacker has already created an `archive-all` inbox rule on Outlook Web — this is an AiTM session-token theft, not just a stolen password.
Rated SEV-3 / P3. Treat as a P1 confirmed credential compromise on a Finance account: a malicious sign-in already succeeded.
- Treat as a P1 confirmed credential compromise on a Finance account: a malicious sign-in already succeeded.
- Containment-first: reset password, revoke active sessions, and review the inbox rule before any forensic deep-dive.
- Loop in the Identity / M365 admin and Finance management; this account touches sensitive workflows.
- Reset Alice's password and force sign-out everywhere (`Revoke-MgUserSignInSession`) so the stolen refresh token is invalidated.
- Disable the `archive-all` inbox rule and any new mailbox forwarding rule the attacker added.
- Block the phishing domain `acme-corp-login[.]net` and the malicious sign-in IP at proxy / Conditional Access; isolate the workstation if you suspect endpoint compromise.
- Pull the Entra ID sign-in logs around 09:22 UTC, confirm the `python-requests/2.31` session and the missing MFA challenge (token replay, not interactive sign-in).
- Audit Alice's mailbox for new inbox rules, auto-forward, OAuth grants, and any messages already auto-archived in the last hour.
- Cross-check the proxy log for other users who hit `acme-corp-login[.]net` and search the fleet for the same source IP / UA.
- Pull Alice's recent activity (file access, Teams DMs, sent items) so the impact statement is grounded in evidence, not assumption.
- Re-enable the account only after password reset, session revocation, and a clean device check.
- Enforce phishing-resistant MFA / Conditional Access for Finance users (and revisit the AiTM-resistant policy globally).
- Run a targeted phishing-awareness refresher and add `acme-corp-login[.]net`-style typosquats to user training examples.
- Preserve the original phishing email with full headers (.eml) before anyone deletes it from the mailbox.
- Export the Entra ID sign-in log, the mailbox audit log, and the proxy session for 185.244.25.17 / `acme-corp-login[.]net`.
- Capture screenshots / API exports of the malicious inbox rule before disabling it; record hashes / case ID in the ticket.
- Brief Alice and her manager on what happened, the actions taken, and what she should not do (do not click follow-up `verify your account` mail).
- Notify Identity / M365 admins and the on-call SOC lead with a short timeline of containment steps.
- Hold customer-comm unless investigation confirms data accessed via the mailbox; do not over-escalate before scope is known.
- Do not delete the reported phishing email — preserve it as evidence first.
- Do not just reset the password without revoking sessions — the stolen refresh token will keep working.
- Do not wipe Alice's laptop before forensic capture / triage.
- Do not share the new password over email or chat.
Dangerous actions to avoid
- Do not delete the reported phishing email — preserve it as evidence first.
- Do not just reset the password without revoking sessions — the stolen refresh token will keep working.
- Do not wipe Alice's laptop before / triage.
- Do not share the new password over email or chat.
How to improve next time
- An -protected tenant can still be breached by token replay — assume token theft any time `python-requests` or a hosting-IP appears in a sign-in log.
- Always pair password reset with session / refresh-token revocation; one without the other is a half-fix.
- Auto-created inbox rules (`archive-all`, hidden forwards) are a classic post-AiTM tell — check and preserve them before disabling.
- Preserve the original phishing email as .eml with full headers before users delete it.
- Treat the M365 identity, the workstation, and the mailbox as three separate surfaces; each may need its own step.
Request an AI review of this attempt
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AI Tutor
This tutor explains your result. It does not change your score. Pick a question to see how the deterministic grading reached your verdict and where to focus next.
Generated deterministically from your graded result — no AI model was called.
Why did I get this score?
Your verdict was Fail at 26/100. That total is the sum of deterministic rubric points across 8 categories — each scores how much of its expected, ordered steps your answer covered, not an opinion about your writing. Your strongest coverage was Asset impact (67%). Points were held back mostly in Attack understanding (0%), Recovery (0%), Evidence preservation (0%).
Re-read the attack understanding expectations for this scenario and list the concrete steps you missed.
This tutor explains your existing result. It does not change your score, verdict, or grade. Generated deterministically from your graded result — no AI model was called.
What should I improve first?
Focus on Attack understanding first — it is your weakest rubric area at 0% coverage and carries weight 15. For this scenario: Name this as adversary-in-the-middle / session-token replay (the 09:22 sign-in had no MFA challenge), not just `phishing for a password`.
Rewrite your attack understanding section as a short numbered checklist before your next attempt.
This tutor explains your existing result. It does not change your score, verdict, or grade. Generated deterministically from your graded result — no AI model was called.
How does my answer compare to the model answer outline?
Compared with the model answer outline, the most useful sections to study are the ones matching your weak areas. Re-read the outline's attack understanding, recovery, evidence preservation guidance and check which listed points you did not cover. The outline is a high-level checklist of expected points — use it to find gaps, not to copy a finished answer.
Pick one model-answer section you missed and add its key points to your next response in your own words.
This tutor explains your existing result. It does not change your score, verdict, or grade. Generated deterministically from your graded result — no AI model was called.
Which rubric area mattered most here?
Containment mattered most here: it carries the highest rubric weight (20), so coverage there moves your score the most. You covered 20% of it this time, worth 4 points.
Prioritise the highest-weight categories first; make sure containment is fully addressed before lower-weight ones.
This tutor explains your existing result. It does not change your score, verdict, or grade. Generated deterministically from your graded result — no AI model was called.
What should I study next?
Based on this attempt, study attack understanding, recovery, evidence preservation next. Coaching tip for this scenario: An MFA-protected tenant can still be breached by token replay — assume token theft any time `python-requests` or a hosting-IP appears in a sign-in log.
An MFA-protected tenant can still be breached by token replay — assume token theft any time `python-requests` or a hosting-IP appears in a sign-in log.
This tutor explains your existing result. It does not change your score, verdict, or grade. Generated deterministically from your graded result — no AI model was called.
Coach Notes
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